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A b s t r a c t Effective response to natural or man-made disasters (i.e., terrorism) is predicated
on the ability to communicate among the many organizations involved. Disaster response exercises
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The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the World
Trade Center and the Pentagon have illustrated the
unfortunate reality of the terrorist threat within the
Unites States. Concomitantly, these events height-
ened the awareness of emergency response and secu-
rity organizations at the federal, state, and local lev-
els throughout the U.S. and the world, and many of
these organizations have been reexamining and
evolving their disaster and terrorism preparedness
and response plans. Examination and analysis of the
events leading up to the September 11 attacks, the
response to the events, and prospective assessment of
readiness to detect or respond to other terrorism
attacks, including weapons of mass destruction
(WMD), have revealed that one of the most pressing
issues is to improve communication among all of the
disparate intelligence, law enforcement, and emer-
gency response organizations involved in the detec-
tion and response to terrorism.1,2
On May 31 and June 1, 2002, the East Carolina
University (ECU) Telemedicine Center participated
in a regional terrorism response exercise sponsored
by the Camp Lejeune Marine Corps Base/Onslow
County Military-Civilian Task Force for Emergency
Response (MCTFER), the North Carolina Division of
Emergency Management, and the Coastal Carolina
Regional Steering Committee (CCRSC) for Domestic
Preparedness. This event was conducted at the Camp
Lejeune Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain
(MOUT) training facility, which is a full-scale town
used for urban combat and search and rescue train-
ing. Multiple activities were concurrently conducted
during the two-day exercise, including hostage res-
cue, mass triage, firefighting, mass decontamination,
aeromedical transport, foreign animal disease detec-
tion and management, and family assistance, to name
a few. Personnel from local, county, state, and mili-
tary emergency medical services (EMS), fire, police,
emergency management, and specialized response
units (e.g., hazardous materials) participated in the
exercise. The goals of the ECU Telemedicine Center’s
participation were to demonstrate and test the fol-
lowing within the context of simulated terrorist or
mass casualty events: (1) existing telemedicine net-
works, systems, and operations concepts and (2) rap-
idly deployable satellite, local wireless networking,
and mobile clinical and environmental monitoring
technologies. Such systems and practices offer the
potential for improving interresponder and inter-
agency coordination and for keeping all parties
informed about evolving conditions at the scene of
the disaster.
Background
As evidenced in many disaster events, existing pub-
lic-switched telephone networks (PSTN) and cellular
telephone networks can be become quickly disabled
or overwhelmed, rendering them degraded or use-
less for disaster response communications. This may
result from either physical damage to the communi-
cations infrastructure or extreme demand that
exceeds the network’s ability to handle increased
usage (i.e., insufficient surge capacity). Frequently,
however, hospitals and other clinical facilities rely
solely on PSTN or cellular telephone systems for
emergency communications. Emergency response
and public safety organizations use separate
radiofrequency (wireless) terrestrial communications
networks and avoid reliance on PSTN or cellular net-
works. However, these systems can become over-
whelmed in large-scale disasters. One possible solu-
tion to loss of terrestrial communications infrastruc-
ture during a disaster is the use of satellite networks
for voice and data communications.
The use of in-place telehealth networks is another
way to improve communications reliability for med-
ical response to disaster or terrorism events. Accord-
ing to the American Telemedicine Association,3 over
200 telehealth networks within the U.S. are linked to
more than 2,000 clinical facilities. These high-speed
networks can be used in the event of a disaster for
many applications, including improved triage and
medical transport decision making, interfacility or
interagency collaboration, teleconsultation, training,
postevent psychiatric/psychological consultation, or
long-term patient follow-up. Currently, several pro-
posed initiatives address the utilization and intercon-
nection of existing telehealth network resources to
support the disaster application. For example, the
Southern Governors Association’s Telehealth/Home-
land Security Task Force has conducted an assessment
of telehealth, public health, and distance learning net-
works within its member states as a first step in deter-
mining how such existing resources can be used to
support regional disaster preparedness and response.
Like many telemedicine programs throughout the
U.S., the ECU Telemedicine Center operates an exten-
sive high-speed telecommunications and videocon-
ferencing network to serve patients throughout its
regional service area. The ECU network consists of
heterogeneous communications links, including full
and fractional T-1 (1.54 Mbps), Integrated Services
Digital Network (ISDN) at multiples of 128 kbps
Basic Rate Interface (BRI) most commonly aggregat-
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ed at 3 BRI (384 kbps), Plain Old Telephone Service
(POTS, up to 56 kbps), Internet 2 (OC-3, 155 Mbps),
and fixed point wireless Ethernet (45 Mbps). Both
H.320 and H.323 videoconferencing systems are used
in the ECU network, and three multipoint conference
units enable these disparate systems to interoperate.
In addition to ECU-managed network sites, several
other videoconference sites are frequently intercon-
nected via the ECU Telemedicine Center for distance
learning and grand rounds via the North Carolina
Information Highway (NCIH) and North Carolina
Research and Education Network (NC-REN).
Although all of the aforementioned sites are designed
primarily for clinical telehealth and distance educa-
tion, they also can be used to support disaster or ter-
rorism response operations.
The ECU Telemedicine Center used the MCTFER
exercise as an opportunity to assess the feasibility
and operations concepts for using in-place videocon-
ferencing networks, satellite communications, wire-
less Local Area Networks (LAN), and Internet
Protocol (IP) biomedical and environmental data
telemetry for disaster response. The exercise
involved a simulated scenario of a nerve agent attack
on a high-school graduation ceremony and was con-
ducted to test both the individual response plans of
participating organizations and local and regional
interorganizational coordination. 
Design Objectives
Medical response to natural disasters or acts of ter-
rorism requires a diverse team, distributed at many
locations. Emergency department staff at rural hospi-
tals and regional trauma centers will be involved in
decision making and patient care. On-scene respon-
ders will include emergency medical technicians and
paramedics as well as firefighters and law enforce-
ment personnel, hazardous materials teams, and vol-
unteers. Many other county, state, and federal emer-
gency management organizations will be involved.
This complex effort absolutely requires effective col-
laboration, mediated by telecommunications, and
up-to-date information about conditions at the scene.
As previously described, disasters often disable or
degrade standard communications modes. Therefore,
the most fundamental system requirement is redun-
dant, fault-tolerant communications/network infra-
structure. Associated applications will be required to
improve medical response to natural or manmade
disasters. These basic requirements can be decom-
posed into several constituent elements:
1. Redundant wide-area network (WAN) or “reach-
back” infrastructure to enable connectivity
between geographically dispersed personnel:
• Fixed WAN assets: the existing ECU Telemedi-
cine network and other in-place networks
• Deployable WAN systems: satellite communi-
cations, cellular telephone, amateur radio
2. On-scene wireless LAN infrastructure to support
responders in the field who will be dispersed
throughout the scene.
3. Collaboration applications, including videocon-
ferencing and voice communications to facilitate
interaction between field-deployed personnel and
remote decision makers.
4. Remote sensing and telemetry of biomedical and
environmental parameters to improve “situational
awareness” (i.e., assessment of victims or on-scene
conditions).
5. Basic network-enabled IT productivity applica-
tions (i.e., e-mail, file transfer, web browsing).
Additional requirements can be further derived or
implied from these core requirements and knowl-
edge of the nature of disaster response operations.
Applications that use the communications/network
infrastructure must be able to use any potential net-
work path and not be constrained by proprietary pro-
tocols linked to physical characteristics peculiar to
individual modes of communication. Therefore,
applications should be optimized for IP networking.
In addition, on-scene systems should be mobile and
able to operate without an AC power source (i.e., bat-
tery, solar, or other alternative power).
Systems Description
Multiple systems were demonstrated and tested
within the context of the MCTFER exercise to exam-
ine their utility for on-scene disaster response opera-
tions. Examples include in-place networks, satellite
and local wireless networking for reach-back and on-
scene communications, clinical and environmental
devices, videoconferencing systems, and information
technologies. 
In-Place Networks 
As described previously, the ECU Telemedicine
Network consists of ISDN and T-1 connections to
various clinical sites throughout the region, with
capabilities to interconnect with several other net-
works throughout the state, as well as the Internet via
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Internet 2. Several of these sites were in counties that
participated in the exercise. These sites, plus other
key operational sites, were interconnected in a multi-
point videoconferencing session (Figure 1): (1)
Onslow Memorial Hospital (Jacksonville, NC) and
Duplin General Hospital (Kenansville, NC) via T-1
(H.320) links, (2) Pitt County Memorial Hospital
(Greenville, NC) and the State of North Carolina
Emergency Operations Center (Raleigh, NC) via
ISDN (H.320) links, and (3) the deployed ECU Tele-
medicine Center team at the MOUT (Jacksonville,
NC) via IP satellite (H.323). Existing ECU Telemedi-
cine Center multipoint conference units were used to
make the necessary interconnections between the dis-
parate videoconferencing systems and standards.
Satellite “Reach-back” Communications
Three different satellite communications systems were
deployed to facilitate reach-back connectivity, includ-
ing the Global Communications Solutions (GCS) 212,
Starband, and two Inmarsat Global Area Network
(GAN) systems. The U.S. Army Telemedicine and
Advanced Technology Research Center provided one
of the Inmarsat GAN units for the exercise and the
other was provided by GCS. Both Iridium and
Globalstar satellite telephones provided voice commu-
nications and 9.6 kbps telemetry, and a packet radio
(Ham) was used for 300 bps telemetry. The GCS-212
system consisted of a 1.2 m parabolic antenna and
very small aperture terminal (VSAT) that connected to
the GCS network operations center (NOC) in Victor,
NY, at 768 kbps. From the GCS NOC, IP traffic was
delivered to the commodity Internet via a 3 Mbps con-
nection and reached the ECU Telemedicine Center via
Internet 2 (OC-3). The router at the MOUT was con-
figured to connect four analog telephones, and these
were switched into the PSTN at the GCS NOC, pro-
viding reliable voice communications.
The Starband system is a 35-pound satellite dish that
can be used anywhere within the continental U.S.
and aligned southward to connect with the Telstar-7
satellite to establish a sharable Internet connection.
F i g u r e  1 .  The network configuration that supported the multipoint videoconference during the exercise.
The gateway for the Starband system is a desktop or
laptop PC with either two network cards or one net-
work card and a free Universal Serial Bus (USB) port.
The Globalstar system uses a collection of Low Earth
Orbit (LEO) satellites that use telephone handsets
roughly the same size and power requirements of a
commercial cellular phone handset.
Local Wireless Networking
Commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) 802.11b wireless
network access points were used to provide connec-
tivity on-scene at the MOUT. A NETGEAR (model
ME102) access point was used to cover the
Telemedicine Operations Center, while two Linksys
(Instant Access model WAP11) systems were bridged
to provide outdoor coverage for mobile users.
Different channel settings were used for the two
manufacturers’ systems (channel 1 for NETGEAR, 6
for Linksys). These wireless networks were connect-
ed into the different satellite networks via cabled (Cat
5) connections. A highgain antenna was used with
the outdoor access point.
On-scene Video
GCS provided a Zydachron H.323 codec that enabled
IP videoconferencing. The ECU team also tested a
commercially available 802.11b-enabled web cam (D-
Link DCS-1000W) that was used for general on-scene
video streaming at VGA resolution. The system has
an onboard webserver that allows the camera to oper-
ate without a dedicated PC. The video stream from
this system can be viewed from any PC with Internet
access and a standard web browser client. The system
can be configured to automatically take digital still
photos at defined intervals or as triggered by an exter-
nal sensor signal (e.g., motion, infrared), however,
these capabilities were not used during the exercise.
Additionally, two mobile video systems were tested: a
GCS “video vest” and a wearable computer with a
web cam. The GCS system is a vest that has an inte-
grated video camera, headset with microphone, and
battery pack; it allows the user to transmit video and
two-way voice via a 900-MHz wireless link back to a
transceiver at the telehealth operations center. The
video and audio from the mobile user can be routed
into the auxiliary inputs on the codec to enable reach-
back to other sites, although this capability was not
tested during the exercise. ECU Telemedicine Center
personnel also used a wearable computer, manufac-
tured by Charmed, Inc., that had a Pentium 2 233-
MHz processor, 20-GB hard drive, 128-MB RAM, 2
PCMCIA card slots, with onboard Ethernet and USB.
The Charmed device was outfitted with a USB
Logitech Quickcam VC web cam and used Microsoft
Netmeeting software (H.323). This system used the
802.11 wireless LAN to connect back to satellite reach-
back communications to videoconference externally.
Clinical and Environmental Data Telemetry
The presence of reliable reach-back and local wireless
networking infrastructure allows on-scene respon-
ders to utilize information technologies to collaborate
electronically with key external players and provide
up-to-date, if not real-time, data about the disaster
scene and medical response operations. The satellite
and wireless LAN systems enabled ECU Telemedi-
cine Center personnel to demonstrate and test com-
munications-enabled biomedical and environmental
monitors, videoconferencing, and basic information
technologies, including notebook PCs, webcams, and
personal digital assistants (PDAs).
The ECU-developed “TopHat” platform (Figure 2) is
central to providing IP data telemetry from devices
and sensors. TopHat is a micro-webserver with four
serial (RS-232) ports and one Ethernet (RJ-45) port
that enables devices to communicate via a shared net-
work connection. TopHat is based on the 22.1-MHz
Rabbit 2100 Microprocessor. Four five-volt CMOS
compatible serial ports are used at the same time as
the 10Base-T Ethernet port. TopHat can be simultane-
ously controlled by the network port, one serial port,
or programmed thresholds. The network control con-
sists of user interaction with an internally hosted web
page and TopHat periodically checking an e-mail
account for commands or new parameters. Multiple
users can concurrently interact with the network
aspect of TopHat. The serial control can be via a per-
sonal computer running any of the major operating
systems or a PDA. Programmed thresholds include
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F i g u r e  2 .  The ECU TopHat micro-web server platform
was used to convert serial device data to an Internet
Protocol stream.
sensor or device data parameters exceeding specified
limits, or patterns of events triggering programmed
responses. An event pattern typically includes sensor
thresholds on multiple sensors exceeding pro-
grammed parameters within a certain time frame.
With built-in power regulators, TopHat is capable of
being powered by 120 VAC, 7.2 VDC 3-amp battery,
automotive cigarette lighter, solar power, or any com-
bination thereof. 
TopHat was used to interface with several of the
deployed devices. Clinical devices that used TopHat
during the exercise included Welch Allyn Vital Signs
monitor (Model 52000) and Roche Diagnostics’ Accu-
Check Complete glucometer. TopHat was used to
interface with environmental monitoring devices,
including Rae Systems’ MultiRAE Plus air and chem-
ical detection system and a Black Cat Systems’ GM-
10 radiation detector (Geiger counter).
TopHat was connected to the wireless LAN via either
a direct cable connection to one of the wireless access
points/routers or via a wireless 802.11b connection
and then subsequently to the Internet connections
provided by the satellite systems. TopHat was con-
nected directly to the Qualcomm GSP-1600 satellite
phone via an RS-232 serial cable interface and com-
municated with the aforementioned clinical or envi-
ronmental monitors as well as notebook computers.
TopHat also was used with a cellular telephone.
TopHat posted device data via the satellite connec-
tions to a remote Apache webserver and a Cold
Fusion server at ECU that could be accessed by any
authorized person with Internet access. In addition to
posting data to remote web servers, the TopHat’s
internal webserver enabled data to be locally dis-
played on PDAs, including both a Handspring Visor
and Compaq iPAQ. The network configuration that
supported all of the field-deployed technologies is
depicted in Figure 3.
Two other environmental telemetry systems, devel-
oped by ECU Telemedicine Center personnel, were
tested, one for personal monitoring, the other for
wide-area monitoring. The personal system provided
location tracking and environmental monitoring
hardware. The equipment consisted of an APD2000
(Smiths Detection, Environmental Technologies
Group, Baltimore, MD) gas monitoring system and a
Magellan 315-GPS unit. Both were interfaced via cus-
tom controlling hardware that in turn controlled data
flow to a 9600-bps, 2.4-GHz radio transmitter. Every
time the APD2000 sent environmental data, GPS data
followed immediately afterwards. The APD2000 was
configured to transmit data approximately every 30
seconds unless the unit detected dangerous levels of
a substance. If it detected dangerous levels, it would
immediately transmit data. 
The GPS unit sent a continuous stream when in con-
tact with satellites. When the controlling hardware
detected data from the APD2000, it would get the rel-
evant data from the GPS unit and send it immediate-
ly after the APD2000 data. The radio transmitted to a
receiver, serially attached to a computer. Data were
displayed in Hyperterminal, a terminal emulator that
comes installed with Microsoft Windows.
The wide area system was stationary and based on
packet (ham) radio. Often the least common denomi-
nator in disaster situations is ham radio, which is
used when other modes fail. Ham radio is highly reli-
able, has a wide coverage area, is flexible to change
bands/equipment, mobile, and has a large base of
knowledgeable operators. A Graseby Dynamics GID-
3 was used for environmental chemical detection and
a Magellan 315 GPS unit for positioning. Both were
interfaced via custom controlling hardware that in
turn controlled initialization and data flow of a
Kenwood TH-D7AG, packet-radio-equipped, hand-
held radio. The frequency was adjustable. The con-
trolling hardware was setup to send both GID-3 and
GPS data every 10 seconds. When the entire system
was turned on, the controlling hardware set up the
radio with an identification call, and then prepared to
transmit data. The hardware was connected to the
GID-3 and GPS and controlled the flow of data into
the radio.
Both the GID-3 and GPS units output data continual-
ly. The controlling hardware took a sample of data
from each device every 10 seconds and sent it to the
radio. A receiving radio was connected to a packet
modem that, in turn, was connected serially to a PC
and displayed all information on the computer. All
data traffic protocols were handled by the packet
modems and made sure that data were sent and
received with error checking. Data were retransmit-
ted if necessary. Data rates were set at 9.6 kbps, since
both systems produce low bit-rate data streams.
Status Report: Performance of the System
During the Regional Disaster Response
Exercise
For the exercise, the ECU Telemedicine Center used
the MOUT’s Building 5 (Embassy Building) to set up
a communications and telehealth operations center.
The three-story building, constructed primarily of
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concrete blocks, had limited interior lighting and 120-
VAC electrical power. This particular building was
selected because it had an unobstructed view of the
Southern sky and a large flat rooftop that was suit-
able for deploying antennae. On the first day of the
exercise, the ECU team was allowed to drive its vehi-
cles on site to drop off equipment at the base of the
building. The test strategy was to simulate an actual
event, and, therefore, set up all of the equipment de
novo and measure the time required to set up com-
munications links from unpacking the boxes until
connectivity was verified. Performance of the many
systems tested during the exercise is described below.
Testing of In-place Networks
Existing networks were tested in the “tabletop” simu-
lation of a nerve agent attack on a high-school gradua-
tion ceremony. A tabletop exercise is a facilitated, sce-
nario-driven activity that involves participants describ-
ing how they or their organization would respond to
events that arise during the scenario. An important
component of this tabletop simulation was the coordi-
nation of emergency medical response among hospi-
tals in the region. This involved testing the procedures
and protocols for interhospital communication of bed
availability and staffing levels, coordination of mass
casualty medical transport (air and ground), determi-
nation of in-place and supplemental medical supply
needs, and assessment of the situation at the high
school. In addition to usual means of communication,
the ECU Telemedicine Center made its network avail-
able for use in management of the event.
From the time the first request for video connectivity
was received at the Telemedicine Center, a multi-
point videoconference was successfully established
within 30 minutes on an ad hoc basis. The two rural
hospital sites (Duplin General and Onslow
Memorial) were able to communicate with the
regional trauma center, Pitt County Memorial
Hospital. The telehealth operations center at the
Camp Lejeune MOUT was connected into the confer-
ence via the GCS-212 satellite system (via the GCS
NOC in NY). The State Emergency Operations
Center was bridged into the multipoint conference.
Nonetheless, once these connections were demon-
strated, they were not further used for the tabletop
F i g u r e  3 .  The overall architecture of the communications and telemetry network involved satellite reach-back commu-
nications integrated with local wireless networking and device communications.
simulation and sat idle until later that afternoon
when senior exercise planners at the MOUT used the
session to discuss the exercise’s progress with State
Emergency Management officials at the Emergency
Operations Center in Raleigh. Therefore, although
the capability to bridge multiple sites of different
standards over varied network paths on an ad hoc
basis was successfully demonstrated, it was not test-
ed as a tool to improve intersite, interagency coordi-
nation of disaster response.
On-scene Communications
The on-scene communications concept was to
assume that the local telecommunications infrastruc-
ture was unavailable and to use multiple, redundant
satellite paths of different bandwidths for reach-back
connectivity and wireless networking for local com-
munications. The ECU Telemedicine Center tested
the different, previously described satellite systems
for reach-back and local wireless networking for on-
scene communications. The bandwidth, communica-
tions protocol, and set-up time for each of the satellite
systems are listed in Table 1.
To the extent practical, devices were configured to use
IP so that devices could interoperate and transmit crit-
ical data regardless of the physical network path(s).
This allowed devices that inherently supported IP, or
were converted to IP via the TopHat micro-web serv-
er platform, to use all of the network paths, whether
the high-bandwidth 768 kbps GCS-212 system or the
4kbps GlobalStar satellite telephone. Using IP proto-
cols would allow devices to use existing local or wide-
area networks, the PSTN, emergency response RF,
packet radio (ham) or cellular networks, if they were
available in a disaster situation, without requiring the
devices to be reconfigured. 
Once the satellite links were established, two wireless
LANs were set up and connected to the GCS 212 and
Starband satellite systems. The COTS 802.11 wireless
LAN products readily provided local network infra-
structure without modification. These commercial
wireless LAN products provided coverage through-
out the MOUT (approximately 0.25 mile radius), and
Ethernet bridging capabilities allowed access points
to interconnect, further increasing the possible cover-
age area. The 802.11b networks were set up in under
five minutes (the time it took to move the antennae to
the desired locations and run the cable). One of the
wireless LANs used a high-gain antenna that provid-
ed long-range line of site connectivity within a hori-
zontal plane. The other wireless LAN used a lower-
gain antenna and did not provide as much line of
sight distance, but performed better in the scenario
with a higher vertical range of coverage. The low-
gain antenna was able to broadcast over buildings,
whereas the high-gain antenna’s limited broadcast
angle of plus or minus 13 degrees could not reach
over or around buildings. 
On-scene Video
Videoconferencing and video streaming technologies
that were tested on-scene during the exercise per-
formed well over the wireless LAN and satellite
reach-back communications. IP video calls were
established between the field-deployed system and a
Polycom VS-4000 IP codec at the ECU Telemedicine
Center at 128 kbps, 256 kbps, and 512 kbps. Although
the same satellite link was simultaneously used for
Internet reachback, only limited degradation of the
video was observed even when in a 512 kbps video-
conference. As described previously, this videocon-
ference link from the field was tied into a multipoint
videoconference that was established for the regional
tabletop simulation. 
The satellite paths added noticeable latency to the
videoconference, but users quickly accommodated
their communication patterns to account for the
increased delay. Videoconferencing capabilities
enabled field-deployed personnel to collaborate with
remote experts, coordinate planning and logistics
activities, and provide real-time assessment of on-
scene conditions. The wireless web cam provided sur-
prisingly good video quality and could be useful for
remote surveillance of the scene and disaster response
operations. The two wearable video systems demon-
strated the feasibility of using such systems for mobile
operations, such as telementoring of responders.
Clinical and Environmental Data Telemetry
The TopHat was primarily used at the telehealth
operations center in the MOUT’s Building 5, but it
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Table 1 ■
Bandwidth, Protocols, and Set-up Times for the
Different Satellite Reach-back Systems Tested
During the Exercise
System Bandwidth Protocols Set Up Time
GCS 212 768 kbps IP 2 hr
Starband™ 70 kbps downlink
35 kbps uplink
(asymmetric) IP 2 hr, 10 min
Inmarsat GAN 128 kbps ISDN 10 min
Globalstar 4 kbps IP (PPP) 40 sec
was also deployed at other locations at the MOUT. A
mock serin gas attack was simulated at the MOUT’s
high school gymnasium, and the TopHat was
deployed there for simultaneous monitoring of simu-
lated gas levels with the MultiRAE device, location
with a Magellan 315 Global Positioning System
(GPS), and radiation levels with a GM-10. When radi-
ation levels exceeded preset thresholds with a
radioactive test sample, TopHat transmitted its loca-
tion and radiation levels over the 802.11b network via
hypertext transport protocol (http). When TopHat
was out of 802.11b range and was unable to send data
using its network connection, it automatically
switched communications to the cellular phone that
was also connected and successfully posted its data
to a Sun Cobalt Qube web server running Perl 5 and
Apache webserver. The Perl script that accepted the
data then notified a predefined list of people as a
response to the data that was posted. 
TopHat was demonstrated both inside and outside
the ECU Telemedicine Center’s van. TopHat was able
to communicate from within the van with devices
that were located outside of the van via Bluetooth
personal-area wireless communications using
Connectblue’s Bluetooth Serial Port Adapter. TopHat
was able to work outside of the van with the sensors
directly, with a wireless connection back to a
Handspring Visor inside the van.
TopHat was also tested as a wearable platform,
broadcasting GPS data, radiation levels, and toxic gas
levels on a web page that it hosted. When radiation
thresholds were reached, TopHat posted data to an
external web server while running its own web serv-
er and simultaneously transmitted e-mail messages
to external team members. When the 802.11b net-
work connection to TopHat was disconnected,
TopHat continued to post radiation data readings
through the Globalstar Qualcomm GSP-1600 satellite
phone. The user interface for TopHat was a
Handspring Visor connected to TopHat through
TopHat’s data port. The Handspring Visor was run-
ning a Palm OS program that was able to configure
TopHat’s alarm thresholds, network settings, and
view data from the devices attached to TopHat.
Both of the amateur radio-based environmental data
telemetry systems were evaluated within the MOUT
site. Both systems had similar performance charac-
teristics. Set-up times were limited to connecting and
turning on the hardware. This typically required 5–10
minutes. A simulated toxic gas sample (oil of winter-
green) was used to test the systems’ responses. Both
systems immediately transmitted gas concentration
and GPS data when stimulated by the simulated
toxic gas sample. Receivers in the telehealth opera-
tions center successfully collected these data from
different indoor and outdoor locations throughout
the MOUT within an approximately 500-yard radius.
At the request of the Onslow County EMS team, ECU
Telemedicine Center determined a means to use the
Internet to transmit electrocardiogram (ECG) data
from their standard field deployed Medtronic
Physio-Control LIFEPAK 12 system. The LIFEPAK 12
is capable of using a modem or a direct serial con-
nection but was not able to send recorded ECG sam-
plings across the Internet. A Bluetooth Serial
Adapter™ from Connectblue, Inc. was used to inter-
face the LIFEPAK 12 with a Bluetooth-enabled
Compaq iPAQ. The files could be transmitted from
the LIFEPAK to the iPAQ, using e-mail, ftp, or web
based upload, to multiple recipients anywhere else in
the world. This capability was established de novo
on-scene at the MOUT, with no prior integration
work performed before the exercise. Communication
between the LIFEPAK 12 and the iPAQ was estab-
lished, and the data files were sent to Medtronic
Physio-Control specialists. The data were not view-
able on site, as this required using proprietary soft-
ware, but Medtronic Physio-Control personnel were
able to view these data at their location.
Alternative Power
Although AC electrical power was available in the
telehealth operations center, rechargeable battery
packs and solar panel systems were used and tested.
The solar panel system tested was a commercial off
the shelf panel, PowerQwest’s Suncatcher Expedi-
tion. The battery packs were 7.2V, 3A NiMh batteries
available at any electronics store. Several devices,
including the TopHat and 802.11b wireless access
points, were designed to use the same commercially
available power connectors, which enabled power
systems to be interchangeable. TopHat was powered
by the battery system, automobile cigarette lighter,
and solar panel. Although several of the devices
worked off their own proprietary batteries, they
could have been adapted to use the battery or solar
power systems. 
Discussion
Extensive network and videoconferencing infrastruc-
ture is already in place to support telehealth through-
out the United States. During the exercise, the ECU
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Telemedicine Center demonstrated that its network
can be activated in a timely manner to support disas-
ter operations, and existing multipoint conference
units can enable disparate network and videoconfer-
encing standards to interoperate. The test scenario
involved hospitals in the affected area, the trauma
center that is responsible for coordinating disaster
medical response in the region, the NC Emergency
Operations Center, and an on-scene team. This
demonstrated only one use of the network: adminis-
trative management of disaster response and medical
assets. However, other potential clinical applications
include the following:
• Assistance for overwhelmed emergency depart-
ments and facilitation of transport decisions
• Consultation with regional or National centers of
expertise in diagnosis and management of bioter-
rorism agent exposure
• Psychologic/psychiatric consultation (e.g., post-
traumatic stress)
• Long-term follow-up with disaster victims
• “Traditional” telehealth (i.e., medical specialty
consultation)
Although ECU’s telehealth network can provide
tremendous benefit in disaster response, these
resources are not part of current disaster response
plans. In fact, although relevant sites in the network
were activated for the tabletop simulation, partici-
pants at those facilities did not use the systems for the
exercise. Ironically, one of the chief problems noted
during the postexercise debrief was the inability to
communicate with the involved hospitals, because the
hospitals’ switchboards were overwhelmed. Mean-
while, the already activated videoconferencing links
were mostly idle. This illustrated the need to add the
telemedicine networks to response plans, advertise
that they are available, and use them in disaster drills. 
However, one key change in the existing network
must be made: telehealth network-related systems
must be put on primary back-up power (generator)
systems to ensure that these resources are available in
case of loss of electrical power. Currently, none of the
nodes, including the hub at the ECU Telemedicine
Center, is on primary back-up power.
A bridged wireless LAN network would allow the
use of IP-based video, data, and voice products that
would enable collaboration between personnel in iso-
lated on-scene locations or surveillance and remote
monitoring of a “hot zone” from a safe distance.
These wireless networks could be either isolated or
connected to the rest of the Internet via the reach-
back paths, or separate private and public networks
could be deployed. Furthermore, a wireless LAN
infrastructure would support communications with a
mobile responder who is equipped with wearable
computing, monitoring, or video systems.
During the exercise only real-time videoconferencing
and streaming technologies were tested, but asyn-
chronous video transmission also can be employed if
network bandwidth is insufficient to support video-
conferencing or if higher than NTSC (i.e., broadcast
television) resolution is required. Several inexpensive
MPEG-1 and MPEG-2 digital video encoders are
commercially available and work with standard per-
sonal computer interfaces. Also, digital still cameras
would be a valuable part of a field-deployed system,
both for clinical diagnostic purposes and to provide
images of the disaster scene.
The concept of using web-enabled clinical and envi-
ronmental devices and wireless communications was
demonstrated. Although only small numbers of
devices were used during the exercise, it is feasible
that an array of devices and sensors could be simul-
taneously monitored on scene or remotely to assess
the nature and extent of casualties. Ostensibly, many
environmental sensors, linked with GPS coordinates,
could be deployed in a hazardous area by protective-
suited personnel, left in situ, and remotely monitored.
These hazardous agent concentration and location
data could then be combined with meteorologic and
mapping data to provide detailed assessment of the
situation and prediction of the spread of toxins.4
A primary barrier to remote monitoring of casualties
or the environment is the lack of widely employed
data representation and interoperability standards in
COTS devices. For the exercise, ECU Telemedicine
Center engineers had to develop a means of convert-
ing vendor-proprietary data and communications pro-
tocols. Serial data communications protocols can be
translated readily to IP via the use of micro-webserver
platforms, such as TopHat. However, data representa-
tion and device control standards must be developed
to enable interoperability without customized systems
integration. Such standards would allow data from
any device to be readable by any device or application.
This goal can be accomplished by using an open
source standard, such as extensible markup language
(XML) and/or the Common Object Request Broker
Architecture (CORBA), as a basis for interoperability.
Currently, several efforts are under way to use open
source standards for health and scientific device inter-
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operability, including Health Level Seven–Version 3,
which uses XML schema to represent health data, and
Instrument Markup Language, which is a variant of
XML for astronomic instrumentation.5
To achieve the vision of internet-worked, distributed
disaster medical response, environmental and clini-
cal device interoperability standards must be devel-
oped and adopted. The lack of interoperability
between clinical devices and information systems has
limited the adoption of telehealth as well. Perhaps
the post-September 11 emphasis on improving
bioterrorism preparedness, public health surveil-
lance, and emergency response coordination will be
the impetus for achieving this goal.
The technologies demonstrated during the exercise
operated well in the hands of technically trained and
experienced operators. However, a truer assessment of
the performance and usability of these technologies
should be based on their use by emergency responders.
It is anticipated that a combination of improved human
factors engineering, technical training for emergency
response personnel, and making technical experts
members of the response team will be required to make
such systems work in real conditions.
This exercise provided the opportunity to test tele-
health technologies and operations concepts for med-
ical response within the context of a simulated disaster
response environment. The unique locale and its con-
comitant isolation, with environmental and logistical
challenges, provided a suitable setting for simulating
disaster response operations. Using a simulated disas-
ter situation allows system developers and disaster
planners to test innovative technologies and
approaches in a relevant environment without worry-
ing about the consequences of failure. The use of exist-
ing terrestrial telemedicine networks for disaster/ter-
rorism applications was demonstrated, and the set-up
and performance of enabling, rapidly deployable
satellite, wireless LAN, videoconferencing, and clini-
cal and environmental data telemetry technologies
were evaluated. The exercise validated several basic
requirements for using telehealth to improve disaster
response (Table 2). Further refinement of these require-
ments will involve additional testing and exercises
that incorporate “real” users, including emergency
responders, physicians, and disaster planners.
This experience helped develop and evolve extramu-
ral collaborative relationships, and the ECU Tele-
medicine Center was able to leverage the experience
and in-kind support of these collaborators.
Relationships with other local and regional organiza-
tions were cultivated by participation in the exercise
and will be invaluable in the development of disaster
response plans and infrastructure to better support
the region, the state, and the nation.
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Table 2 ■
Recommendations, Based on the Exercise, for
Functional Requirements for Both Fixed and
Deployable Telehealth Systems.
For existing telehealth networks
• On-call personnel at telehealth hubs
• Multipoint conference units to bridge disparate videocon-
ferencing standards and networks
• Back-up power at telehealth spoke sites
• Integration of telehealth network in disaster plans
For on-scene operations
• IP satellite connectivity to provide reliable reach-back
communications infrastructure
• Satellite telephones for voice and low data rate telemetry
• Wireless LAN access points with bridging capabilities for
field operations
• IP videoconferencing
• Webcams for incident scene surveillance
• Digital still cameras
• IP-enabled clinical and environmental monitoring devices
• Common interface alternative power sources (e.g., battery
and solar)
• Basic computing platforms, including notebook PCs and
PDAs
